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ROY W. BAHL

I

s China one of the world’s most decentralized countries, or one of the most centralized? In fact, it is both. On one hand, 70 percent of all government expenditures pass through the subnational government budgets. On the other hand, subnational governments have no independent (formal) taxing powers. The question
that might be raised is whether the longer-term intention is to develop a system of
local public finance that would give subprovincial governments more fiscal discretion, or whether some other structure is envisaged. Either way, the issue to consider
is what specific reform packages would move China toward its goal.
On average, subnational governments account for about one-third of all government spending in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. The economic model that explains the efficiency gains from this
fiscal decentralization, however, does not travel so well to transitional and developing countries, where subnational government expenditure autonomy is less prominent in the budgetary makeup. Nor does it fit as well where elected and autonomous local governments are not the norm. The purpose of this chapter is to review
structural practices in fiscal decentralization and to ask whether the international
practice holds any lessons for China.
The analysis of local public finance in China must be put in a different context
than in other countries. This is because taxation powers in China are almost completely centralized and because decisions about tax policy, tax administration, and
intergovernmental fiscal relations are inextricably linked (Bahl 1999).1 Note also that
China’s formal intergovernmental fiscal system is limited to central-provincial fiscal
relations. The “local public finance” system is mostly about provincial-local fiscal relations, and this structure varies from province to province. Since local governments

1
Tax policy decisions and tax administration efficiency affect the total pool of funds available for revenue sharing. The revenue-sharing arrangements can provide incentives for subnational governments to divert funds to
extrabudgetary accounts, thereby reducing central government revenues.
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have no formal taxing power, and since provincial governments are totally dependent on the center for their revenues, central-provincial fiscal arrangements define
the budget constraint for local governments. Central-provincial relations, therefore,
cannot be separated from the discussion of local government spending and financing. Finally, when we talk in this chapter about “local government” in China, we will
mean the three tiers of government that operate at the subprovincial level.2
This said, we begin this discussion by noting the very great importance of subprovincial governments in the fiscal system. This importance might be measured both in
terms of the amounts spent by subprovincial governments and in terms of the important functions for which they have responsibility. On average, the 2004 China
Statistical Yearbook reports that in 2004 subprovincial governments spent 571 yuan
per person, an amount that can be compared to the 679 yuan spent by the central
government (excluding transfers). Provincial and subprovincial governments have
heavy responsibility for the provision of social security, health care, basic education,
public safety, and economic development services. The budget emphasis on social services is even greater for subprovincial governments than for provincial governments.

The Decentralization Model: Theory and Practice
China has never formally adopted a fiscal decentralization program in the sense of
issuing a white paper that outlines a strategy for empowering its local governments. Nor has it called for significant autonomy and more self-governance at the
bottom tier of government, as was done, for example, in the constitutional amendments in India in the 1990s. In fact, China has sent mixed policy signals about
whether it will or will not move toward a more decentralized structure of government. On one hand, subnational governments now account for about 70 percent of
all government expenditures, and there have been recent policy measures designed
to strengthen subprovincial finances (Lou 2008). On the other hand, the major
1994 reform recentralized intergovernmental finances on the revenue side, and
policy actions since have continued in this direction. All of this may be due to growing pains, and a country as large as China may eventually find fiscal decentralization irresistible. Or possibly the Chinese style of decentralization, and the way it
goes about developing its local public finance system, will be different from that
seen in other parts of the world. So the question we might start with is whether the
western decentralization model is a good or bad fit for China.

Theory
The fiscal decentralization model is by now well known. At its core, it is about capturing the welfare gains that come from moving government decision making closer
to the people. This economic efficiency argument drives the thinking of most economists who work on this subject (Oates 1972). The argument is straightforward. Let
us assume that people’s preferences for government ser vices vary—for example, because of religion, language, ethnic mix, climate, or economic base. Let us assume
further that people have sorted themselves so that those with like preferences live in
2

These include prefectures (prefecture-level cities), counties (county-level cities), and townships.
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the same province (city, township).3 If subnational governments respond to these
preferences in structuring their budgets, decentralization will result in variations in
the package of ser vices delivered in different places. People will get what they want,
and the welfare of the population will be enhanced. Under the same circumstances,
but with a centralized system, ser vice provision would be more uniform, and people
in different regions would be less likely to get the ser vice mix they want.
Advocates will point out that successful fiscal decentralization can at once attack several of the problems that face developing economies: revenue mobilization,
innovation in economic decision making, accountability of elected officials, capacity development at the local level, and grassroot participation in governance.
This story on the benefits of decentralization is a good one, and it is easy to believe that these welfare gains exist, even if they cannot be precisely measured. An
important question is whether these gains are large enough to warrant the (possible)
disruption of the national public financing system that would be brought about by
the required structural changes. There also is the question of whether these gains are
attainable in China—that is, whether the necessary conditions are in place to capture the benefits of moving to a decentralized system.
For fiscal decentralization to be fully successful, a number of conditions must be
met. First, regional and local government legislatures must be accountable to the
regional and local population. If local political leadership is elected, the question
becomes whether the electorate has the information and inclination to exercise the
vote to assure accountability. If these political leaders are appointed rather than
elected, the question becomes whether they see their self-interest as being joined
with the satisfaction of the local population.
Second, the chief officers of the regional or local government must be accountable to their legislature. If they are appointed by the center or state, their allegiance
will be to a higher level of government, and local programs may not be delivered according to local preferences. One can imagine the problems that could arise. The
mayor’s directive about enforcement of property tax penalties for failure to pay might
have a hollow ring if the chief local tax collector is appointed by a higher-level government. The same might be said for the implementation of local health and education policies.
Third, subnational governments should have some independent taxing powers—
that is, provincial and local governments should have the ability to determine at
least the tax rate for some important sources of local government finance. This is
important if the local population is to hold the political leadership accountable for
the quality of public ser vices delivered. The test to which politicians will be put by
local voters will be a much harder one if voters pay directly for ser vices than if services are financed by a transfer from the center.
Fourth, subnational governments should be responsible for some important government ser vices. The issue here is that the local voters should care about the quality
of ser vices delivered. In most cases, states and provinces are assigned ser vices that
affect the quality of people’s lives and so this criterion is satisfied. However, in the
3
Note that the economic base and location characteristics of the local government also will shape people’s
preferences.
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case of local (third-tier) governments, this is not always the case. Where these local
governments are given responsibility for little more than housekeeping functions,
the local population is not likely to revolt over the quality of ser vices delivered.
Fifth, subnational governments should have adequate discretion over the level and
composition of expenditures. If a higher-level government mandates the expenditures, the subnational government has little ability to respond to citizen preferences.
Excessive mandates can be an important impediment to fiscal decentralization.
What we conclude from this discussion is that the efficiency gains that might be
captured with fiscal decentralization are far from automatic. There must be a structure in place to allow the subnational government to capture these gains. In some
ways, China would seem a likely candidate to capture the efficiency gains from fiscal decentralization. Certainly, the fourth and fift h (expenditure) tests discussed
above are passed because provincial and lower-level governments have control over
a significant share of the expenditure budget and can set expenditure priorities.
Subprovincial governments in particular are called on to deliver important social
ser vices (education, health) that matter to the local populations. Direct central control over chief local officers has been relaxed since the 1980s. Directors of fiscal agencies and tax bureaus are now appointed by provincial governments, though the
provincial government leadership itself is appointed by the center.
In other ways, local governments in China are constrained in their fiscal choices.
They are saddled with mandates and expenditure controls, and they have little or
no independent taxing powers.
Finally, there is the issue of the vote. While half of all government spending does
pass through local government budgets, there is little popular political representation (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006). Without political representation, the local
population has no direct way of revealing its preferences for more or fewer public
ser vices. The provincial governors are still appointed; thus their accountability is
upward, to the level of government and the political body that appointed them and
will reward them. This absence of political representation at the local level is the
major difference between decentralization in China and that in OECD countries.
Evidence supports the argument that an absence of political representation and
the appointment of political leadership have not been impediments to local economic growth. In this respect, the Chinese version of federalism that empowered
centrally appointed local officials, rewarded their successes with economic development, and encouraged them to compete with one another appears to have been a
successful alternative to political decentralization (Qian and Weingast 1997).

Practice
One might test the hypothesis that the benefits of decentralization outweigh the
costs by looking for evidence of the growing fiscal importance of subnational governments. In fact, countries around the world have moved only slowly toward the
adoption of more decentralized intergovernmental fiscal systems. Bahl and Wallace (2005) use International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook data to estimate that the subnational government share of public expenditures has remained at about 13 to 14 percent in developing countries over the last
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TABLE 13.1

Distribution of Government Expenditure and Taxes by Level of
Government, 2003 (percent)
China

Central
Provincial
Subprovincial

United States

Canada

Brazil

Exp.

Taxes

Exp.

Taxes

Exp.

Taxes

Exp.

Taxes

30
18
52

100
0
0

48
21
31

56
24
20

41
45
14

54
37
9

60
28
12

70
26
4

source: International Monetary Fund, various issues.
note: Exp. = expenditures.

three decades.4 The subnational government expenditure share is more than two
times higher in the OECD countries and also has been stable over this period.
China is an outlier in this comparative empirical picture. First, its subnational
government expenditure share is about 70 percent, arguably the highest in the
world. Second, it is an outlier in terms of vertical balance—that is, in the extent to
which subnational government taxes are adequate in amount to cover subnational
government expenditures. To illustrate, we show comparable statistics in table 13.1
for China, the United States, Canada, and Brazil. In the United States and Canada,
the local government (subprovincial) share is a smaller, 31 and 14 percent of total
government spending, respectively, but local taxes cover two-thirds or more of
total local spending. In Brazil, the local government share of spending is 12 percent, and about one-third of this is financed by local taxes.5
These average levels of fiscal decentralization hide a great deal of intercountry
variation, which several analysts have tried to explain using cross-section regression
analysis. Bahl and Wallace (2005) found that the subnational government expenditure share is significantly higher in countries with a higher per capita GDP, a larger
population size, and a lower degree of corruption. This more or less matches the findings in other studies.6 China is not easily “fitted” to the conclusions from this regression analysis. Its low per capita GDP would suggest an expected lower level of expenditure decentralization, but its larger size would suggest an offsetting effect.7

The Financial Instruments of Fiscal Decentralization
Subnational government budgets in most countries are driven by expenditure assignments, and financing is provided through subnational government taxation,
4
Decentralization is measured here as the subnational government share of total government expenditure—
that is, subnational government expenditures as the numerator and total central plus subnational government
expenditures as the denominator. Th is is a flawed (though commonly used) measure of fiscal decentralization
because it does not indicate whether the subnational government has any significant influence over how the money
will be spent.
5
In India, by contrast, state governments fi nance about half of current expenditures from their own revenue
sources (Rao 2009).
6
For a good literature review, see Letelier (2005).
7
In the Bahl and Wallace study, the elasticity of expenditure decentralization with respect to per capita GDP,
and the elasticities with respect to either population size or land area, are not significantly different.
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by intergovernmental transfers, and in some cases by borrowing. The practice of
using these instruments, however, is different in China from the international practice, particularly with respect to expenditure and revenue assignment. On this subject, we can say more about provincial government finance than we can about local
government finance, since data at the subprovincial level are difficult to come
by—in most developing countries and in China.

Expenditure Assignment: International Practice
The division of government expenditure responsibility among central, provincial,
and local governments can fall back to four sets of “rules” or “guidelines.” The first
is that the central government should have primary responsibility for stabilization
policy and income distribution policies (Musgrave 1959). Provincial-level stabilization policies—for example, borrowing to stimulate job creation—would fail because factor mobility would result in the benefits from provincially fi nanced
programs spilling over to other jurisdictions. In the case of income distribution
responsibility, provincial and local governments are not likely to have the resources
to address the needs for income security, and, in any case, the mobility of labor and
capital could weaken the revenue base and increase the size of the client population
in the province. According to the conventional thinking, this leaves subnational
governments to concentrate on the allocation function—that is, to decide how resources will be divided among various expenditure heads and how the funds will
be raised.
The second set of guidelines address the issue of how to decide which expenditure responsibilities will be allocated to which level of government. In the context
of local government finance, one might begin with the decentralization theorem
“Ser vices should be delivered at the lowest possible level of government consistent
with allocative efficiency.” The two qualifications are the following:
1. The presence of economies of scale will push the assignment of responsibility for
a function to a higher level of government or to an autonomous body. Examples
include public utilities and regional hospitals.
2. The presence of external benefits or costs in the delivery of a function will force
its assignment toward a higher level of government. Examples include interprovince trunk roads, research universities, and medical schools.
For the most part, these basic rules are reflected in expenditure assignments.
Central governments are usually responsible for at least the financing of transfer
payments to individuals, interprovince roads, defense, and the justice system, while
provincial or state governments may have responsibility for interlocal roads, regional hospitals, large-scale irrigation projects, and the like. Depending on their
size, local governments and autonomous local agencies may have responsibility for
general urban maintenance, including local streets, water, sewerage and solid waste
disposal, public transportation, basic health ser vices, and primary and secondary
education. There are departures from this assignment pattern, of course, but in
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most countries the expenditure assignments more or less “follow the rules.” 8 Problems with expenditure assignment more often arise when there are concurrent assignments, that is, when two levels of government share in the provision of a function. In that case, the responsibility for ser vice delivery can become murky as a
result of duplication of effort or failure to deliver the ser vice.
The third guideline for expenditure assignment is the time-tested advice of public finance students: “Finance follows function.” The rule here is that the right order
for sequencing is to first assign expenditure responsibilities among levels of government and then assign revenue-raising powers. This suggests that the right progression is to determine the revenue needs for a subnational government by first
costing out the minimum level of ser vices to be provided. If the process begins instead with allocating a share of the national budget to subnational government,
this funding formula becomes the first step in the process of defining the level of
ser vices that will be delivered. The whole question of minimum ser vice levels becomes obscured by the issue of affordability.
Despite these good arguments, many (most) countries focus on defi ning a revenue entitlement for subnational governments and then fi nd a way to make expenditure needs fit this constraint. For example, Indonesia decided on the allocation of 25 percent of central taxes to its local governments, and the Philippines
decided on 40 percent, without calculating these percentages according to a detailed assessment of expenditure needs. Another part of this sequencing argument is that efficiency in subnational government fi nancing (particularly for local
governments) depends on the specific ser vices that are delivered. For example,
efficiency considerations might dictate that education be financed by a combination of local taxes and transfers, parks by general local taxes, and refuse collection by user charges. Absent a knowledge of the expenditure responsibilities of
subnational governments, how could the most efficient assignment of revenues be
decided?
A fourth guideline is that there should be a (vertical) balance between expenditure assignment and revenue assignment. The counterfactual here is a one-to-one
ratio of own revenues to expenditures. Deviations from this norm should occur
because transfers are needed to bring public ser vice levels in poorer jurisdictions
up to some acceptable level and to correct for underprovision of ser vices where
there are large spillover effects. Where a low revenue assignment is made to subnational governments, the intergovernmental transfer system must be set at a high
enough level to fill in the gap between local revenues and the minimum level of
ser vices. A mistake often made is to over-assign expenditure responsibility to subnational governments, relative to the central government’s ability to finance the
necessary vertical share with transfers. The result of this is sometimes a soft budget
constraint for subnational governments that might be fi lled by bailout-type grants
from the center or by imprudent borrowing by the subnational governments.

8
For a good discussion of the criteria for expenditure assignment and the complexities of making assignments,
see Ebel and Vaillancourt (2008).
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Expenditure Assignment: China
The assignment of expenditure responsibility is spread across tiers of government
in China. Approximately 70 percent of expenditures are made below the central
government level and 52 percent below the provincial government level. By comparison with other large countries, China makes heavy use of subnational governments in delivering public ser vices (table 13.1). There are, however, some features of
the practice of expenditure assignment in China that are at odds with best international practice. The fact that nearly all subnational government expenditures are
financed by central transfers is a significant difference in approach.
One might question whether it makes sense to apply international norms to
China. In some ways the international experience of expenditure assignment is not
relevant to China. The absence of political representation means that accountability, in the western sense of the concept, is not so relevant an issue. Moreover, many
of China’s provinces are larger than most countries, so some of the problematic
spillover issues encountered in other countries might be less relevant.
On the other hand, some of the international norms are relevant. China’s assignment of expenditure responsibilities is still emerging. There remain some anomalies
that go back to pre-market times and that are not sustainable under the present
economic system. Some rethinking of expenditure assignments might rank high on
China’s intergovernmental reform agenda (Lou 2008). In this regard, reform thinking might center on the important issues of responsibility for income maintenance
functions, clarity in expenditure assignment, and sequencing (whether function
should follow finance). Changes in all of these areas are necessary if there is to be a
sustainable vertical balance in the Chinese intergovernmental fiscal system.
Income Maintenance. A striking difference between China and most other
countries is the degree to which subprovincial governments are responsible for
income-maintenance functions. Social welfare and unemployment expenditures
are a responsibility of the subprovincial governments in China. This responsibility
includes the compensation payments and pensions of former workers in stateowned enterprises. Subnational governments account for a large share of expenditures for “pensions and social relief” and for subsidies to social security. Within the
subnational sector, responsibility for the bulk of these expenditures falls to prefectures and counties.
As a result of these expenditure assignments and the reforms of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), the fiscal systems of prefectural and county-level cities have
come under pressure. There were defaults on the payment of pensions and unemployment benefits and a wave of popular protests that were most pervasive in
the “rust belt” cities of the Northeast (World Bank, forthcoming). In response, the
central government intervened with subsidies to bail out subprovincial governments. In many cases, the grants and subsidies from the central government have
not been adequate to offset mandated increases in expenditures. The central government has also introduced such measures as social security reforms, the merging
of unemployment benefits with the SOE living stipend schemes, dibao (minimum
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living stipend) schemes, and the urban medical insurance scheme, aimed at restoring budgetary stability to local governments.
Unclear Assignments. The assignment of functions is not clear. Expenditure may
be assigned to levels of government as exclusive responsibilities or as concurrent
responsibilities. While most analysts favor the exclusive route in order to maximize
clarity in who is responsible for what, most countries have a significant list of concurrent functions. China is no exception here. Arguably, China’s budget laws are
less precise in defining expenditure responsibility than is the case in many other
countries. In the case of provincial-local governments, the issue is particularly
murky (Dollar and Hofman 2008).
The result of this murkiness is underprovision of ser vices for some functions
and duplication of ser vices in other cases. This situation could lead to higher-level
governments imposing mandates to force spending in “uncovered” areas, and it
compromises accountability because it is not clear exactly what functions local
governments are responsible for. Moreover, without a clear assignment of expenditure responsibility, it is not possible to define “minimum expenditures” that ought
to be the foundation of the intergovernmental transfer system.9
1. Sequencing. Another departure of China practice from the basic principles of
public finance (a departure shared by most developing countries) is that the public
finance system is structured with function following finance. That is, the resource
distribution appears to be decided independent from the division of expenditure
responsibilities. An important international lesson, often hard-learned, is that if
these two sides of the public finance equation are separated, significant fiscal disparities can result. Large fiscal disparities now characterize the Chinese intergovernmental fiscal system (Dollar and Hofman 2008; Lou 2008). Interprovince
disparities in spending in China are larger than among subnational governments in
OECD countries.
2. Macroeconomic management. Contrary to the budgeting principles that recommend reserving macroeconomic policy and management for central governments, China assigns significant responsibility in this area to subnational governments. Provincial and local governments have formal responsibility for economic
development and industrial policy. They carry this out through various tax incentives, tax preferences, subsidies, and regulatory activities. A mixing of public service responsibility and economic development responsibility has led some local
governments to accumulate significant debt. As the market economy continues to
develop, some responsibility for macroeconomic management almost certainly
will be removed from subnational governments.
3. Local discretion. While subnational governments do account for a large share
of expenditures, and they do have considerable freedom in rearranging expenditure priorities, their autonomy is limited by mandates placed on them by higherlevel governments.
9
For a discussion of the problems that come with concurrent responsibilities for ser vice provision, see
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2008).
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4. Reform direction. To date, intergovernmental reforms in China have left the
question of expenditure assignment mostly untouched. In fact, the comprehensive
1994 reform dramatically recentralized revenues but was mostly silent on expenditure responsibility (Bahl 1999). More recently, the rural fee reform and elimination
of the agricultural income tax, without revenue-neutral compensating grants, had
the same effect. These policy changes significantly exacerbated the vertical imbalance and put great pressure on the intergovernmental finance system to both fi ll
the financing gap and equalize the fiscal disparities.

Revenue Assignment: International Practice
The revenue assignments made in a country answer the question about what levels
of government will be allowed to levy what taxes. There is no complete agreement
among scholars and practitioners about which taxes are best assigned to subnational
governments. There are, however, a number of general guidelines in the public finance literature:
1. In a system of fiscal decentralization, subnational government officials should
be accountable to their voting constituency if the welfare gains are to be fully
captured. Local voters will put their elected officials to a harder test on efficient
ser vice delivery if ser vices are substantially financed by locally imposed taxes.
2. Local taxation promotes efficiency in local government spending. Without provincial or local government taxation, the tax price for public ser vices will be set
too low, and the subnational government will tend to overspend. Or the demand
for local government ser vices will outrun the allocation of intergovernmental
transfers, and without taxing powers local governments will underspend. By
“subnational government taxing powers” we mean the autonomy to determine
the level of tax revenue, at least by setting the tax rate.
3. The choice of tax instruments to be used by subnational governments should be
influenced by administrative costs, and by “correspondence”—that is, the burden of the tax should be borne within the jurisdiction where the benefits of the
resulting expenditures are enjoyed.
4. Provincial-level governments can levy broad-based income and sales taxes where
administration permits. In the case of income taxes, this might take the form of a
piggyback on the central tax.
5. Lower-level governments should tax immobile factors. This is usually taken to
include taxes on property, licenses on local businesses, and certain taxes on
motor vehicles.
6. The smallest of local governments should focus on user charges or benefit
taxes. Because of administrative problems, their tax structures should stress
simplification.
The practice of subnational government taxation in most industrial countries is
in step with these principles, but the practice in developing countries is not. The
practice in OECD countries includes using income and sales taxes at the state (provincial) level and allowing the subnational governments to set the tax rate. At the
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local level, cities and municipalities rely heavily on the property tax and on taxes
on motor vehicles, but they also may use piggyback sales or income taxes (as in the
United States and Denmark) or profits tax (as in Switzerland).
The story is very different in developing countries, where local government taxes,
on average, account for only about 10 percent of total taxes. There often is intense
resistance on the part of central governments to delegating taxing powers to the
third tier. In fact, there are relatively few instances in developing countries where
local governments, or even provinces, have been given significant taxing powers.10
The assignment of taxes to subnational governments in many countries appears to
have been more ad hoc than based on first principles. Subnational governments in
low-income countries often have inherited taxes that are too politically hot for the
center to handle (taxes on agriculture) or very difficult to administer (property taxes
or sales taxes on ser vices). Often, the “local taxes” are not local taxes at all because
the rate and base are defined by higher-level governments.

Revenue Assignment: China
The most important characteristic of the Chinese practice is that subnational governments have no control over setting the rate or base of the major taxes in the
system. In effect, all taxes are central. Subnational governments can influence revenue outcomes by their use of industrial policy to grow the tax base, and in some
cases by their collection efforts, but the international practice of setting the tax rate
at the provincial or local government level is not followed.
Chinese terminology treats the subnational government share of central taxes as
“own-source revenues.”11 In part, this is because the tax-sharing arrangement is
viewed as an entitlement of the recipient government. Another justification is that
subnational governments feel that they have some discretion in influencing the
revenues from these taxes. First, they may influence the growth in the tax base by
providing a better climate for investment and for growth in productivity. Second,
they may be more efficient collectors of taxes, have some formal responsibility for
tax administration, and have better knowledge about local taxable activities. This
reasoning leads some Chinese analysts to think of increases in own-source revenues as increased revenue mobilization by subnational governments.
By this categorization, subprovincial governments in China received nearly
40 percent of their revenues from “own sources” in 2003 (World Bank 2006), but
this percentage fell over the 1995–2003 period. In part, this is because the central
government has reduced its revenue sharing with the provinces—for example, the
subnational shares of the personal income tax and the enterprise income tax have
been reduced. The World Bank (2002) argues that provinces have passed on some
of this decline in revenue sharing to lower-level governments. There is another
important implication, however. Since the financing of subprovincial governments
has been shifting from shared taxes (an entitlement approach) to transfers (a more
10

There are, of course, exceptions—for example, Argentina, Brazil, and India.
In most countries, own-source revenues of a local government are those over which the local government has
some discretion to set the tax rate. A shared tax whose rate and base is determined by a higher-level government
is more properly thought of as an intergovernmental transfer (Bahl and Linn 1992).
11
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discretionary approach), decisions about the sectors and regions where public resources will be invested are increasingly determined by provincial governments.
Little detail can be given about revenue assignments at the subprovincial level,
because these assignments vary from province to province. In general, the pattern
seems to follow the central-provincial pattern: No independent taxing powers, and
now a shift from revenue-sharing entitlements to grants-in-aid.
Local governments can make use of extrabudgetary funds—that is, nontax revenues that can be used for financing public ser vices. Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2008)
estimate that extrabudgetary expenditures were equivalent to 23 percent of budgetary expenditures in 2002. While down from levels in the early 1990s (Bahl 1999),
this share is still significant.

Revenue Assignment: Reform Directions for China
China’s development of a harmonious society could benefit from a reform of its revenue assignment model. Depending on national development strategy, and on the
issues that the government would like to address, a number of reform directions
might be considered. First, the present system will not establish an accountability
of political leaders to local taxpayers to the same degree as would provincial and
local government taxation. If the longer-term goal is to bring some political accountability to the system, the option of giving rate-setting powers to subnational
governments might be considered. This could also address the problem of soft budget constraints.
A second issue that might be addressed with revenue assignment is equalization. Under the present system, subnational governments have no possibility for
substituting locally raised revenues for intergovernmental transfers in order to
meet expenditure demands. Such a substitution could free up intergovernmental
transfers for the equalization fund at either the central or the provincial level.
A third issue has to do with the present approach of rewarding local officials for
promoting economic development and growing the tax base. This practice may not
be sustainable in the long run because of the perverse incentives that it embodies—
for example, zoning out migrant workers because of their high public-sector costs,
undervaluing congestion and other environmental costs, and failing to take full
account of the additional infrastructure and social costs of continued industrial
expansion. Another reform direction might be to reward provincial and local officials on the basis of quality of ser vices delivered.

Intergovernmental Transfers: International Practice
There are no hard and fast rules about the best way to structure a system of intergovernmental transfers. Moreover, the practice varies widely, from country to
country. There are, however, some generally accepted rights and wrongs that can
guide the practice. The following are some principles that are often discussed:
1. The desired impacts of the transfer system should guide its design. For example,
if a conditional grant is meant to stimulate the production of a particular public
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ser vice, the design of the grant should provide an adequate incentive for the
subnational government to stimulate that production. Or if the idea is to allow
local governments to tailor their spending programs to local preferences, unconditional grants should be used. This guideline may seem evident, but it is not
always followed.
2. The structure of intergovernmental transfers should be transparent—that is,
every recipient government should understand how the size of its transfer will
be determined. Formula-based distributions or derivation-based shared taxes
are examples of transparent distributions of transfers. The impact of changes in
these formulae also can be understood by recipients.
3. Intergovernmental transfers should not be distributed according to the level of
the deficit incurred by a subnational government. Deficit grants are the enemy
of fiscal discipline at either the provincial or the subprovincial level.
4. Higher-level governments should regularly evaluate their transfer programs to
determine whether the objectives are being achieved. For example, if a particular transfer program is meant to be equalizing, it should be subjected to a regular evaluation to determine whether it is achieving this objective.
Even if these general rules are followed, there is ample room to design grant instruments in different ways. A taxonomy of intergovernmental transfers, developed
by Bahl and Linn (1992), defines two distinct components: a vertical sharing mechanism and a horizontal sharing mechanism. There are three more or less common
approaches to determining the size of the total grant pool (i.e., the vertical dimension). Shared taxes are most consistent with decentralization in that they guarantee subnational governments a vertical share, usually a share of a broad-based tax.
Moreover, these transfers often are distributed on an unconditional basis, and so
give subnational governments discretion over how the money will be spent. Ad hoc
transfers determine the vertical share on a political basis, usually on a year-by-year
basis, and reduce the amount of budgetary certainty given to subnational governments. The cost reimbursement determination of the vertical share is used mostly for
the conditional grants that are in the portfolio of most governments. This is a centralizing approach in that it makes transfers from this pool conditional upon spending the money for a designed purpose. The “right” approach to vertical sharing depends on what the central government is trying to accomplish with its transfer
system.
The horizontal sharing mechanism, the allocation of revenues among eligible
recipients, might take the form of derivation—that is, subnational governments may
retain a share of what is collected within their boundaries. Alternatively, they may
receive grants distributed by formula, by cost reimbursement, or according to ad
hoc methods. Until one decides on both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions, the transfer system is not defined and its impacts cannot be evaluated.

Intergovernmental Transfers: Chinese Practice
We can follow this same taxonomy to describe the Chinese central-provincial transfer
system (table 13.2). This schematic allows us to focus on a number of potential strengths
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TABLE 13.2

China’s System of Intergovernmental Transfers
Method of Determining the Total Divisible Pool
Method of Allocating
the Divisible Pool
Among Eligible Units

Speciﬁed Share of
National or State
Government tax

Derivation

tax sharing and rebates
(62.5 percent)

Formula

grants to minority
regions (0.1 percent)

Ad Hoc Decision

Reimbursement of
Approved Expenditures

—
equalization grants
(4.9 percent)

Total or partial
reimbursement of
costs

grants for rural fee
reform (3.5 percent)

Ad hoc

original system
(quota) subsidies

—
wage grants (6.1
percent)
—

earmarked grants
(21.2 percent)

Source: Adapted from Bahl and Linn, 1992.

and weaknesses of the transfer system. The system of transfers to provinces is summarized in table 13.3.
First, we might observe that the system is mostly transparent. Over 60 percent of
transfers are distributed by revenue sharing on a derivation basis. The earmarked
grants (about 20 percent of the total) are the exception to this transparency.
Second, the Chinese system has little equalization built into it, despite the existence of very great fiscal and economic disparities across provinces. Several researchers have pointed out the absence of equalization in the Chinese system of
transfers (Bahl 1999; Dabla-Norris, 2005; Dollar and Hoffman 2008; Lin, 2011;
Shah and Shen 2008). This result might be expected. About two-thirds of transfers
are allocated according to the derivation of collections of VAT and income tax (see
table 13.3). The equalization grant per se accounts for less than 5 percent of total
transfers and is weakly equalizing at best. The remaining transfers in the system
are equalizing but account for a small share of the total.12
Lou (2008, 159) takes another view. He acknowledges large interregional disparities but argues that these have been reduced by the transfer system: “In 2005
the ratio of fiscal revenues in the eastern, central and western parts of China stood
at 60:23:17, while the ratio of their expenditures stood at 46:29:25.”
While we can describe the arrangements for vertical and horizontal sharing as
between the central and provincial governments, we cannot provide a parallel description for provincial-local government allocations. The latter vary by province,
and provinces are not required to report on their arrangements. Nor does the central government regularly monitor their policies.
The central government now raises about 70 percent of all revenues but directly accounts for only about 30 percent of expenditures. It is left to the transfer system to fill
12

For a review, see Shah and Shen (2008).
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TABLE 13.3

Central-Provincial Intergovernmental Transfers: Vertical and Horizontal Shares
Transfer Type

Date Introduced

Vertical Share

Horizontal Share

Derivation basis.

VAT and excise tax rebate

1994

Income tax rebate

2002

General transfer (formerly
transitional transfer)

1995

Original system (quota) subsidy

1980s

The base for the rebate to each province was fi xed in 1994,
to allow maintenance of its previous level of expenditure.
Thereafter, the rebate grows by 30 percent of the growth
of revenues from these taxes collected in the province.
The amount was fi xed in 2002 for each province, to allow it
to maintain its previous level of expenditures.
No fi xed share until 2002. Since 2002 the vertical share has
included the incremental revenues accruing to the central
government from EIT and PIT over the 2001 level.
No fi xed share.

Wage increase subsidy

1999

No fi xed share.

Minority region subsidy

2000

No fi xed share.

Rural fee reform subsidy,
subsidies for agricultural tax
reduction and adjusting
responsibilities

2001, 2003

No fi xed share.

Subsidy from the issuance of
additional state debts

1999

A share of additional state bonds issued under the fiscal
stimulus program.
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Derivation basis.
According to a needs-based formula that includes a
component for the ethnic minority population.
Distributed only to poor and ethnic minority provinces.
Amounts were fi xed in nominal terms in 1987, with only
minor changes for compensatory adjustments.
Initially, this subsidy was given only to the poorer inland
provinces in the central and western regions, to offset the
costs of civil ser vice wage increases mandated by the central
government. Since 2001 Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian
have also been eligible, albeit only for partial compensation.
For the 14 provinces and regions with large concentrations
of ethnic minority populations. Funding comes from
(1) central budget appropriation, and (2) 80 percent of the
incremental VAT collected in the 14 provinces. Half of the
second component is returned to the collecting provinces
and regions by derivation. The other half is pooled with
central appropriations (1) and distributed according to a
needs-based formula.
All provinces are divided into four groups, to receive
compensation for revenue losses under the rural tax-for-fee
reform and the abolition of agricultural taxes, at rates of
100% (central and western grain-producing provinces),
80% (non-grain-producing provinces in central and
western provinces), 50% (major grain-producing provinces
in the coastal region), and 0% (other coastal provinces).
Tilted toward the western and central provinces.
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this vertical gap. Much the same might be said of provincial-local transfers. Subprovincial governments account for an estimated 52 percent of subnational government
expenditures, with virtually no taxing power. Few if any other intergovernmental
transfer systems in the world are asked to carry this much of the financing load.

The Property Tax
The property tax is almost everyone’s choice for a principal local government tax
revenue source in both developing and industrialized countries.13 Despite all of the
good work that has been done in designing more efficient property tax structures
and administrations, however, the revenue yield of the property tax in developing
countries is very low. The best comparable data available (International Monetary
Fund, various years) suggest an average yield equivalent to only about 0.6 percent
of GDP (table 13.4). De Cesare (2004) finds a similar result in her more detailed
analysis for Latin American countries. Note also from this table that the property
tax share of GDP is more than three times higher in the OECD countries than in
developing countries. Lotz (2006), however, observes a limit on property taxes in
OECD countries, perhaps at no more than 3 percent of GDP.
A number of hypotheses have been offered about why property tax revenues are so
low in developing countries. Arguably, the most important reason is that the property tax works best as a local government tax, and fiscal decentralization has not been
as embraced in developing as in industrialized countries. Bahl and MartinezVazquez (2008) use data from a panel of 70 countries for 1990, 1995, and 2000 to
show a significant positive effect of both expenditure decentralization and the level
of per capita GDP on the level of the effective property tax rate.14 Higher-income
countries and countries that are more decentralized use the property tax more intensively. Again, China can be seen as a mixed bag, with its relatively low per capita
GDP a dampening factor and its high level of expenditure decentralization a stimulative factor.
Man (2011, chapters 1 and 6) argues that the burden of the property tax falls on
capital and as such may lead to slower economic growth. Her econometric analysis
of data for over 2,000 counties in China is consistent with this hypothesis. This
suggests that land and property taxes would not be favored by local officials who
are graded on a basis of the economic performance of their jurisdiction.
Another argument for the low level of revenues raised by the property tax is that
efficient administration is very costly, both in terms of the setup (fi xed cost) and the
operating costs. In par ticu lar, proper valuation and revaluation are thought to be
beyond the reach of most subnational government tax administrations, unless very
significant expenditures are made to put the capacity in place. The barriers to efficient administration include the absence of a full and up-to-date survey of all land
(urban and rural) and records of title that would allow tax liability to be determined.
Putting the human resource infrastructure and the information base in place to effi13
Th ree books of essays that review property tax practice in developing and transitional countries are Bahl
(1979); Bird and Slack (2004); and Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, and Youngman (2008).
14
The effective rate of property tax is measured as the ratio of property tax collections to GDP.
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TABLE 13.4

Property Tax as Share of GDP (percent)

OECD countries (number of countries)
Developing countries (number of countries)
Transition countries (number of countries)
All countries (number of countries)

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

1.24 (16)
0.42 (20)
0.34 (1)
0.77 (37)

1.31 (18)
0.36 (27)
0.59 (4)
0.73 (49)

1.44 (16)
0.42 (23)
0.54 (20)
0.75 (59)

2.12 (18)
0.60 (29)
0.68 (18)
1.04 (65)

source: Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008.
note: The average for the 2000s is for the years 2000 and 2001.

ciently administer the property tax would also be an expensive proposition. At current yields of the property tax, it would be difficult to justify such outlays, by either
the central or the subnational levels of government. The result is that most developing
countries improve their administrations with marginal changes rather than with
comprehensive reforms.
Neither is the property tax a major source of revenue in China. Its yield is well
less than the average level of revenues (relative to GDP) raised in developing countries.15 Though the present yield is low relative to other taxes in the system, the
growth in revenues has been significant in recent years (Man, 2011, chapters 1 and
6). Will the property tax become a major source of revenue for China in the future?
If this is to happen, are there lessons in the international experience?
Chinese authorities are reported to be considering developing a local property
tax. This policy initiative has been discussed for several years (Bahl, 1999; TerMinassian and Fedelino 2008). Various rationales have been offered for imposing a
property tax in China.16 In fact, taxes on land and buildings in China already exist.17 The one that is most like the standard property tax is a notional charge per
unit of area used, which varies by location within the urban area (Bahl and Zhang
1989).
Clearly, China could build on this structure to develop a property tax that
would finance a significant share of subprovincial government revenue. An ambitious target for property tax revenues—after a suitable transition period—is 1 percent of GDP. This is about the same share of GDP as that raised from property taxes
in Sweden and Poland. In 2003, it would have yielded 121 billion yuan in revenue.

Deﬁning the Tax Base
The base of the Chinese property tax would likely be real property and land. It
could initially be an urban tax, perhaps levied only by municipalities. Agricultural
15

Th is includes revenues from all recurrent and transfer taxes.
These rationales include the need for subprovincial governments to switch their emphasis away from economic growth and toward the provision of social ser vices and the belief that a better tax system would lead to more
rational subprovincial government behavior, especially regarding land conversion and off-budget financing.
17
For a description of the existing eight taxes on land and buildings, see Hong (2009).
16
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land would be excluded because of the recently rolled-out rural fee reform and the
elimination of the agricultural tax (a land-based tax).
It does not seem feasible for China to adopt a U.S.-style capital value property tax
on land and improvements. Apart from the administrative constraints, the absence
of a property market where land is bought and sold means that there is no good
basis for establishing the values of individual parcels. Some land is leased through a
bidding process, but this remains a small percentage of total land. In most cases,
user rights are assigned. An area-based tax with notional rates, as presently exists,
might be workable if two issues could be resolved. First, rates of tax would have to be
increased dramatically before the property tax could become a meaningful source
of revenue. Second, some method would need to be developed to periodically upgrade the notional location values.

Determining Tax Rates
In many countries, subprovincial governments have discretion in setting property
tax rates. This discretion is justified on the basis of equating the benefits received
from local public ser vices with their (tax) price. Since the quality and cost of public ser vices differ from city to city, one would expect the property tax payment
also to differ. Allowing discretion in determining tax rates could strengthen the
accountability of Chinese local officials in financing and delivering local ser vices.
For example, they could raise the property tax rate in line with expanding the
local budget to improve ser vice delivery.18 In the past, local officials have been willing to raise extrabudgetary fees and charges, so it seems reasonable to suggest that
they might be willing to impose higher levels of property tax if they could retain
the revenues.

Administering a Property Tax
Administrative considerations will strongly influence the structure of the Chinese
property tax. Given the lack of private ownership of land and the absence of an open
market in property transfers, the task is daunting. While there clearly is a market
for real estate, it is not clear what process could be used to assign a value to every
parcel. Moreover, there is no existing cadre of skilled valuers to develop the tax base.
Finally, there is the issue of educating taxpayers and local officials to accept this
new levy. All of this suggests that implementing a significant property tax will be a
gradual process in China.

Leasing
A major issue to be resolved in China is reconciling the concept of a property tax
with the Chinese land tenure arrangements. Hong (2009) poses the question simply:
“How is the government going to get lessees to pay property tax when they do not
own the property?” At present, enterprises and individuals have user rights that are
gained from a competitive bid, negotiation, or a transfer from government. Should a
18

There is some limited rate-setting power for urban subprovincial governments under the present land use tax.
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property tax, or charge, be placed on these users? More to the point, should those
who have purchased leases be charged again with the property tax?
One view is that when a new property tax is enacted, the existing users of leased
land should be taxed, just like anyone else. In other words, leaseholds should not be
given a property tax exemption, nor “grandfathered” (i.e., held harmless in their
treatment). Leasing and property taxes coexist in many other countries (e.g., the
U.K.), and there are many systems (e.g., in The Netherlands) that tax ownership and
use separately.
A tax on land that has been leased may be thought of as a charge for public service benefits, whereas the lease amount is a payment for the use of the property.
However, the original lease amount may well have been higher because expected
subprovincial government public ser vice benefits were capitalized into the value of
the lease. But if these public expenditures were not financed by a property tax, there
would not have been a corresponding land value reduction due to tax capitalization.
If the property tax is new, and the ser vices it finances are new, the case for levying
property tax on top of the lease is stronger.
There is another view. Advocates of grandfathering argue that current leaseholders have already paid many fees on their leasehold that can be considered as
taxes. Research has found that up to 40 percent of the total costs of a lease can consist of fees, many of which are quasi-taxes. If the property tax were to replace some
of the levies and fees already charged, there could be an argument for grandfathering: Existing leaseholders would have paid “extra” taxes in the past. This case is
strongest if the new tax does not finance the provision of new or enhanced ser vices.
Still, a property tax does not differ from any new tax imposed to provide better services. This case for grandfathering is not a strong one.
If the government feels bound to consider compensation for existing leaseholders, a better way would be to relax the restriction on transferability of a lease (which
is currently not possible) or on the use of the land that is leased. Transferability
would increase the value of the land for the leaseholder, it would promote better
utilization of land, and it would soften the blow on current leaseholders who feel
they have been double taxed.

Property Taxation: The Way Forward
Successful implementation of a local property tax requires much planning. The
higher the revenue targets, the greater the amount of planning required. The following areas require detailed planning before introducing a property tax:

•

•

Develop a policy framework for property taxation in China. This framework would
include establishing the tax base and exemption policy and addressing the question of discretion for subprovincial governments to set tax rates. This framework
must be completed and debated before further reforms are undertaken. When
approved, this framework would become the basis for draft ing the property
tax law.
Make provision for the tax administration and for the division of tasks among the
levels of government. This includes establishing acceptable valuation procedures
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and collection procedures. Some processes for training and certifying valuers
must be considered. This step also includes establishing a venue for appeals—a
property tax court. After the administrative planning is complete, implementing regulations can be drafted.
Establish an appropriate data base to support the levying of the property tax.
Every taxing jurisdiction will need an up-to-date cadastre with particulars for
each property, including information on assigned user rights.

Other Local Tax Options
There are at least two other options for subnational government taxes that are
worth consideration in China. Access to the individual income tax has been mentioned in previous studies (Ahmad 2008; Bahl 1999). The international experience
also would suggest taxes on motor vehicles as an option.

Individual Income Tax
If subnational governments in China are to be given an independent source of revenue, in which rate setting can be at least partially delegated to provincial or subprovincial governments, the individual income tax could be a good candidate. This
option has some desirable features as a local revenue source:

•
•

•
•

•
•

It could give subnational governments some discretion in determining the size
of their budgets, and hence could create accountability for their decisions and
the quality of ser vices they provide.
The burden of such a tax, if levied on payrolls, would likely remain within the
local area. There would be little exporting to other provinces or other subprovincial governments. Even in cases where nonresident workers are taxed, part of the
levy could be seen as a charge for using locally provided ser vices.
This could be a productive revenue source, at least for the more urbanized local
areas. Note from the discussion above that at present it constitutes only a small
percentage of provincial and subprovincial government revenue.
Provincial governments could use this reform to improve equalization. By reducing transfers to higher-income subprovincial governments (e.g., prefectures),
which could make up the loss by increasing individual income tax rates, funds
could be freed up for transfers to lower-income subprovincial governments. Or
if provincial governments levied the income tax surcharge, they could allocate
the increased vertical share to an equalization fund.
Higher-income tax rates in wealthier provinces would reflect the access to a better quality of ser vices in those provinces.
Administration for this tax is already in place.

There also are many reasons a subnational individual income tax might not be a
good fit with China’s fiscal strategy. The most obvious is that the central government
has chosen to control tax policy at the central level and has not given discretionary
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taxing powers to subnational governments. The Chinese government may not soon
be ready to shift away from this long-standing component of its economic strategy.
Another weakness of local income taxation in China is that its revenue benefits
might be captured by relatively few subprovincial governments. Zhang and MartinezVazquez (2003) point out that the nine coastal provinces collect 70 percent of income
taxes. This concentration of revenues in higher-income places strengthens the argument that a locally levied income tax could be a good replacement for transfers to
higher-income subprovincial governments.
Competition between the central and subprovincial government sectors for the
revenue base also argues against decentralizing the individual income tax. Recently, the central government has increased its share of income taxes. Even if it did
decentralize this base, again, there would be some concern that it would be reclaimed. Stability would be an issue.
Another argument against reassigning the individual income tax to subnational governments is that there are income-redistribution objectives for individual income taxation that are more properly the responsibility of the central government. In its present form, the Chinese individual income tax structure is built around
a progressive marginal rate schedule. How could China reconcile the incomedistribution objective, which suggests centralization, with the proposal for provincial and local income taxes as a quasi-user charge for local ser vices provided?
The answer is that these goals for the individual income tax will not conflict if
the tax structure is designed properly. There would seem to be two choices for the
design. One route is retaining the present system, whereby the central government determines the rate and base of the income tax and can introduce whatever
degree of progressivity is desired. But this approach fails in two ways. It is counterequalizing across regions, and it offers no provincial-local choice as to the level of
the tax rate. A resident would pay the same income tax rate in Shanghai as in Yantai, even though the marginal cost of delivering local public ser vices in the two
urban areas might be quite different.
The second route is for subprovincial governments to be given some discretion to
determine the income tax rate. Such an arrangement could work as follows: The tax
base would be nationally uniform and defined by the central government. The central government would also prescribe a minimum and maximum rate of tax, and
local (provincial) governments would be given discretion to set their rate within this
range. This is essentially the system used in the Nordic countries (Lotz 2006). One
version of the local discretion approach, and arguably a good transition, would be to
allow urban subprovincial governments (prefectures) to impose a tax as a surcharge
on central income tax liability, with permission from the higher-level government.
The prefecture would retain both its normal share and 100 percent of the surcharge
amount. The center could prescribe a minimum and maximum value for the surcharge.19 If the local tax rate were simply added to the present progressive rate structure, the government’s income distribution intent would be preserved.
19
Th is approach is also favored by Bird (2006) in his review of the world practice of subprovincial government
revenue mobilization.
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Motor Vehicle Taxes
A good revenue source for subprovincial government, particularly for the more
urbanized local areas, is the taxation of motor vehicle use. This could take the form
of tolls, parking taxes, licenses, and even the taxation of motor fuel consumption
(Bahl and Linn 1992). Taxes on motor vehicle purchases are better left to higherlevel governments, but there are good arguments for considering motor vehicle use
as an object of subprovincial government taxation:

•
•
•

•

It could be a very productive revenue source. Certainly the number of motor
vehicles is growing rapidly.
It might serve a social purpose in that it taxes those who impose pollution and
congestion costs on the public.
Charging higher taxes for operating motor vehicles in larger cities (assuming
that larger cities choose to impose higher motor vehicle taxes) would reflect the
higher cost of providing ser vices in those cities. This would move the Chinese
fiscal strategy a step closer to asking residents and workers in different cities to
pay the different marginal costs of the local public ser vices they demand.
It should be administratively feasible. Tolls, licenses, and parking fees are all relatively easy to assess and collect. Taxes on motor fuels are more problematic; moreover, if there are differential tax rates across local jurisdictions, some fuel carrying
could result. Nevertheless, fuel taxes levied in urban areas may be feasible.

Arguments against allowing motor vehicle use to become a subject of local tax
are, first, that it could be seen as an encroachment on central government revenues.
This is particularly true for taxes on motor fuels. Second, some would see this as
discouraging economic growth in larger cities, if larger cities were forced to adopt
higher rates of tax. Third, there would be a political cost of imposing a higher tax
on motor vehicle operation. Finally, the door would be open for tax avoidance measures that could lead to unfairness—for example, special tax treatment for the use
of motor vehicles assigned to government officials.

Conclusions and Reform Options
China’s intergovernmental reforms must be part of a larger reform package that
will define how provincial and local governments fit into the national economic
development strategy. In this connection, a number of questions might be raised:

•
•
•

Will the equalization of public ser vice levels, across and within provinces, become a higher priority goal?
Will the practice of rewarding the local leadership based on economic growth be
discontinued in favor of rewards based on more traditional measures of governmental performance, such as the quality of ser vices delivered?
Will internal migration policies be relaxed to allow rural “floating” workers full
access to local ser vices?
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With these and a number of other questions answered, the government might consider intergovernmental reforms that would lay the groundwork for a system of
local public finance.
China’s system of local government finance is an important component of its
development strategy. About 70 percent of all government expenditures in China
pass through subprovincial government budgets, including expenditures for crucial education and health ser vices and some income maintenance functions. While
China has used subprovincial governments in important ways, it has not embraced
a local government finance system like those that exist in many industrialized countries. Whether such a system should be an objective in China is a matter of government economic policy and governance strategy. That larger question is not addressed here. Rather, this chapter is focused on the lessons that could be learned
from the international experience if China were to adopt an approach of developing a local government finance system.
If China were to be guided by international practice, the following primary issues might be addressed with intergovernmental fiscal policy:

•

•

•

•

There is a significant vertical imbalance in China. Subnational governments account for about 70 percent of government expenditures but have virtually no taxing powers. Subprovincial governments account for about 50 percent of government expenditures and also have virtually no taxing powers. By comparison with
OECD countries, this is a very large vertical fiscal imbalance. The traditional approach to resolving such a large vertical imbalance is to assign taxing powers to
subnational governments.
The intergovernmental system suffers from a horizontal fiscal imbalance, as well.
This shows up in the form of significant fiscal disparities among provincial and
subprovincial governments and in the degree of mismatch between expenditure
needs and revenues available. Other countries address this type of imbalance with
an equalization program. China’s revenue-sharing system tends to be counterequalizing, and some past research suggests that it exacerbates these disparities.
This issue could be addressed by increasing the size of the equalization fund. The
increase might be financed by reducing transfers to higher-income provinces in
return for new taxing powers.
Neither provincial nor subprovincial governments have independent taxing powers. In many industrialized countries, subnational governments have been given
such taxing powers (at least rate-setting powers), and this has allowed them to
meet demands for public ser vices. Among the opportunities for subnational and
subprovincial taxation in China are property taxes, individual income taxes, and
motor vehicle taxes.
As a prerequisite to developing an OECD-style local fi nance system, China
would need to rethink its present expenditure assignment model. First, there
is a need for more precise delineation of the responsibilities at various levels
of government. Second, the present practice of assigning significant responsibility for social welfare and pensions to subprovincial governments might be
rethought.
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